

# Kerberos

Presented by Alexandre de Verteuil  
iWeb Lunch & Learn  
2016-12-14

# Copying



Creative Commons License

This Kerberos presentation by [Alexandre de Verteuil](#) is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](#).


# References

- **Designing an Authentication System: a Dialogue in Four Scenes**  
<https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dialogue.html>
- RFC 4120 - The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)  
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4120>
- MIT 6.858: Computer Systems Security,  
Fall 2014 Lecture 13: Kerberos  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bcWxLI8x33c>
- Kerberos FAQ, v2.0  
<http://www.faqs.org/faqs/kerberos-faq/general/>

# Mainframe and terminals




# Servers and client workstations




# Design requirements, part 1

- The physical security of all hosts is not assumed
- Packets travelling along the network can be read, modified and inserted at will
- Machines that provide services must be able to confirm the identities of people who request services

# Authentication Service



# Service Ticket





# Service Ticket


Kerberos



KDC

User C	$K_C$
Service S	$K_S$

TICKET: {username, service} $K_S$



# Service Ticket

Kerberos



KDC

User C	$K_C$
Service S	$K_S$


TICKET: {username, address, service} $K_S$



# Design requirements, part 2

- Users only have to enter their password once, at the beginning of the session
- Password should not be sent in cleartext

# Ticket Granting Service



# KDC Reply

Kerberos

TGS



KDC


User C	$K_C$
Service S	$K_S$
Service TGS	$K_{TGS}$

TICKET: {username, address, service} $K_S$

KDC REPLY: { $T_{C,S}$ } $K_C$



# Ticket Lifetime



# Design requirements, part 3

- A network service must be able to prove that the person using a ticket is the same person to whom that ticket was issued

# Session Key

Kerberos

TGS




KDC

User C	$K_C$
Service S	$K_S$
Service TGS	$K_{TGS}$


KDC REPLY:  $\{K_{C,S}\}K_C, T_{C,S}$

TICKET:  $\{K_{C,S}, \text{username}, \text{address}, \text{service}, \text{lifespan}, \text{timestamp}\}K_S$







# Authenticator



# Authenticator, non-reusable



# Initial login



# Mail program

Kerberos

TGS




KDC

User C	$K_C$
Service S	$K_S$
Service TGS	$K_{TGS}$

AUTHENTICATOR:  $\{\text{username}, \text{address}, \text{lifespan}, \text{timestamp}\}K_{C,TGS}$   
KDC REQUEST: authenticator, TGT, username, address, servicename  
KDC REPLY:  $T_{C,S}, \{K_{C,S}\}K_{C,TGS}$



# Mutual authentication



# It's just an introduction!

- Cross-realm trust, transitivity
- Changes in Kerberos 5
- sssd, FreeIPA, Samba 4, GSSAPI
- Credentials caching
- Kerberos browser integration